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THE CHANGING FACE OF PARENTS' RIGHTS
Ralph D. Mawdsley*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, courts have
recognized the right of parents to make educational decisions
for their children. Courts and legislatures have sought to
balance the states' authority to educate students 1 with the
parents' natural authority to raise their children. 2 However,
the legal basis for such balancing of interests has changed.
Parents' rights have evolved over four historical periods and
have been influenced in the past thirty years by changing
perspectives concerning the rights of students, school boards,
and justiciable causes of action.
During the first of the four historical periods, spanning the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, various
state courts fashioned common law to determine whether
parents could make decisions contrary to the rules of local
school boards. During the second period, beginning with the
end of World War I, state legislatures took a more active role in

* Ralph D. Mawdsley is a Professor of Educational Administration at Cleveland State
University in Cleveland, Ohio. He received his J.D. from the University of Illinois and
his Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. Dr. Mawdsley teaches courses in school
law, special education law, and sports law. He has published more than 250 articles
and books on numerous legal issues in the field of education. Dr. Mawdsley is a past
president of the Education Law Association, a national organization of attorneys,
higher education faculty, and educational practitioners.
1. Public education is primarily a province of the states because article I, section
8 of the U.S. Constitution does not designate education as one of the functions
delegated to the national government. Although the federal government has enacted
legislation involving various mandates for education, the primary responsibility for
determining the content and implementation of education resides with states. See
generally Mark Yudof, David L. Kirp, and Betsy Levin, Educational Policy and the Law
1-2 (3d ed., West 1992).
2. See Meyer v. Neb., 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ("Corresponding to the right of
control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to
their station in life; and nearly all the states, including Nebraska, enforce this
obligation by compulsory laws.").
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designing compulsory attendance laws. Two prominent United
States Supreme Court decisions during this period facially
challenged the authority of states to prohibit the operation of
nonpublic schools. In the third period, courts wrestled with the
rights of parents to direct their children's education for
religious reasons. This followed a prominent Supreme Court
decision addressing the authority of states to apply facially
neutral compulsory attendance laws to religious-based
nonpublic schools. Finally, in the current and fourth period,
Congress and state legislatures have attempted to restore some
authority to parents. However, parents, frequently frustrated
with such legislative efforts, have tried to assert a variety of
legal claims against public schools.
This article will be divided into two parts to discuss the
changing face of parent rights in directing their children's
education. In the first part, the article will examine the four
historical periods of development referenced above, focusing on
relevant court decisions. This examination of time periods will
show that as the rights of parents to direct the education of
their children have evolved, so also have the rights of students,
school officials, and others in the education process. The second
part of the article will examine how parents' successes in
asserting their rights against public schools have been affected
by legal developments over the past thirty years. This section
will analyze the extent to which the development of student
rights and school board authority has affected claims by
parents under new causes of action.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PARENTS' RIGHT TO DIRECT
THEIR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION

A. Period One: Parents' Rights and the Common Law
Before the Supreme Court created a right of parents to
direct the education of their children through the liberty clause
in Meyer v. Nebraska, 3 states used common law to resolve
school-parent disputes concerning school-required curriculum
or activities. 4 In Hardwick v. Board of Trustees, 5 a California
3. ld. at 390.
4. See e.g. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18, Garvin County v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 579
(Okla. 1909) ("At common law the principal duties of parents to their legitimate
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court queried, "Has the state the right to enact a law or confer
upon any public authorities a power the effect of which would
be to alienate in a measure the children from parental
authority?"6 The court responded that compelling a student to
participate in the social and folk dancing part of the school's
physical education program violated the parent's right to
7
control the education of their children.
[T]o require [children] to live up to the teachings and
the principles which are inculcated in them at home
under the parental authority and according to what the
parents themselves may conceive will be the course of
conduct in all matters which will be the better and more
surely subserve the present and future welfare of their
children. 8
Hardwick is representative of court decisions upholding
objections to required courses either because of the strong
interest parents have in their children9 or because honoring the
parent request would not be disruptive to the school. 10
However, parents have not always succeeded in having
their children excused from a required course. In such cases,
courts relied on both the authority of state legislatures and
school boards to set course requirements, and a fear that
citizens should not be able to nullify reasonable legislation. 11 At
children consisted in their maintenance, their protection, and their education. These
duties were imposed upon principles of natural law and affection laid on them not only
by Nature herself, but by their own proper act of bringing them into the world.").
5. Hardwick u. Bd. of Trustees, 205 P. 49 (Cal. 3d. Dist. App. 1921).
6. ld. at 54.
7. Id. at 49.
8. Id. at 54.
9. State ex rel. Kelley u. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039 (Neb. 1914) (parent could make
a reasonable selection among required courses and decide that his daughter would not
take domestic science so as to have more time to practice her music); Trustees of Sch. u.
People ex rel. Van Allen, 87 Ill. 303 (Ill. 1877) (school could not refuse to admit student
to high school who was proficient in all required subjects except grammar where parent
refused to permit his son to study grammar and grammar was not one of the subjects
that student would study); Garvin County, 103 P. 578 (court ordered reinstatement of
student expelled for refusal to participate in singing lessons as per instruction from
parent); Morrow u. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (Wis. 1874) (school teacher had no authority to
use corporal punishment on a student whose parent had forbidden the child to
participate in geography).
10. State ex rel. Sheibley u. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Dixon County, 48 N.W. 393 (Neb.
1891) (school district could not expel student whose father refused to permit her to
study grammar where there was no evidence that her refusal was insubordinate).
11. See Sewell u. Bd. of Educ. of Defiance Union Sch., 29 Ohio St. 89 (Ohio 1876)
(suspension of student for refusal to have rhetoric exercise prepared was upheld as
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the heart of this support for schools was general desire to
preserve the school's image as a symbol of authority deserving
of respect from students and their parents. Whenever a school
regulation was subjected to challenge, courts expressed the fear
that an attack on the authority of school personnel to make and
enforce rules would produce disrespect for that authority. As a
result, some courts presumed school actions to be reasonable. 12
The success of parents in advancing common law claims to
control the education of their children not only varied among
the states but represented a largely agrarian society where
both the authority of schools boards and parents were
13
significant local forces. However, with the end ofWorld War I,
state legislatures became more active in education by enacting
compulsory attendance laws. The shift to statewide legislation
had a diluting effect on the common law authority of parents.
While parental authority was a prominent force when balanced
against the authority of local school boards, it was not as
significant when balanced against state-legislated rules.
Therefore, parents needed a constitutional right to assert
equally against all states. Parents found just such a right in
two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Meyer v. Nebraska 14 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 15
B. Period Two: Parents' Rights and the Constitution
In Meyer and Pierce, the Supreme Court found within the
liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a right for parents
to direct their children's education. This right created a more
powerful force to balance against the authority of states to
control education. In Meyer, the Court addressed the

pursuant to a reasonable school board rule); Kidder v. Chellis, 59 N.H. 473 (N.H. 1879)
(teacher acted appropriately in removing student from school who refused, pursuant to
parent directive, to prepare a speech in public declamation class); Samuel Benedict
Meml. Sch. v. Bradford, 36 S.E. 920 (Ga. 1900) (student who refused to prepare a paper
for an assignment, but instead read a paper prepared by his parent, could be
suspended).
12. See Smith ex rel. Smith v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 182 Ill.App. 342 (Ill. App.
1914) (student could be expelled for joining a secret society in violation of school board
rule); Bd. of Educ. v. Booth, 62 S.W. 872 (Ky. 1901) (expulsion of student upheld for
improper conduct).
13. See generally Lawrence Cremin, The American Common School, An Historic
Conception (Columbia 1951).
14. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390.
15. Pierce v. Socy. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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constitutionality of a state compulsory attendance statute
providing for a criminal penalty if any school subjects were
taught in a foreign language. 16 When a teacher in a religious
school was charged with teaching the subject of reading in
German to a ten-year-old student, the Court responded by
striking down the statute under the liberty clause. The Court
reasoned that "[the teacher's] right thus to teach and the right
of parents to engage him so to instruct their children"17 were
protected by the Constitution. Not only did parents have a
constitutional righe 8 to direct their children's education, but
the right extended derivative protection to teachers. The Court
found the right to be "within the liberty [clause] of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment." 19
Pierce represented a different challenge for the Supreme
Court. In Pierce, the Court addressed a state compulsory
attendance statute that required all parents to send their
children to public schools. 20 Two nonpublic schools, one
16. The court cited a statute providing that:
'Section 1. No person, individually or as a teacher, shall, in any private,
denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to any person in
any language than the English language.
'Section 2. Languages, other than the English language, may be taught as
languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully passed the
eighth grade as evidenced by a certificate of graduation issued by the county
superintendent of the county in which the child resides.
'Section 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this act shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be subject to a
fine of not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one hundred
dollars ($100), or be confined in the county jail for any period not exceeding
thirty days for each offense.
'Sec. 4. Whereas, an emergency exists, this act shall be in force from and after
its passage and approval.'
262 U.S. at 397.
17. !d. at 400.
18. The Court expanded the protected categories under the liberty clause to
include parent choice of education:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the
included things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.
Id. at 399.
19. Id. at 400.
20. The court cited a statute that provided in substance that
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religious and the other secular, 21 challenged the statute under
the liberty and property clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In invalidating the state statute, the Court, relying on Meyers,
opined that "we think it entirely plain that the [state statute]
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children."22
In one of its clearest statements of parent rights, the Court
proclaimed that "the child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
23
additional obligations."
In both Meyer and Pierce, the Supreme Court dealt with
state statutes that were considered to be facially
unconstitutional because they overstepped state legislative
authority to control parent-directed education. Neither case
addressed a facially constitutional statute that, when applied
to parents, might be unconstitutional. This test came fortyseven years after Pierce in Wisconsin v. Yoder (Yoder). 24
C. Period Three: Parents' Rights and Neutral Compulsory
Attendance Laws

In Yoder, the Supreme Court addressed the application of a
state's compulsory attendance law to the Amish who, because
of their unique religious beliefs and community, 25 wanted their
[E]ffective September 1, 1926, [the Act] requires every parent, guardian, or
other person having control or charge or custody of a child between 8 and 16
years to send him 'to a public school for the period of time a public school
shall be held during the current year' in the district where the child resides;
and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor.
Id. at 530.
21. The two schools were Society of the Sister of the Holy Names of Jesus and
Mary and Hill Military Academy.
22. Id. at 534.
23. Id.
24. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. The Court relates the Amish parents' objection to their children's attendance
at public schools:
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish
beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile
to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and
sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the
peer group, but also because it takes them away from their community,
physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent
period of life. During this period, the children must acquire Amish attitudes
favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to
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children to attend school only through the eighth grade. Unlike
the statutes in Meyer and Pierce, the statute in Yoder was
neutral on its face; it simply required that all students attend
school between the ages of seven and sixteen without specifying
curriculum content or that the school be public. 26 However, the
law in Yoder, as applied to the Amish, would have had a
devastating effect on the Amish community. The Amish feared
that requiring their children to attend public high schools for
two or three years past their completion of the eighth grade in
one-room Amish schools would cause a significant number of
children to leave the Amish community.
In rejecting the reach of the state law to the Amish, the
Yoder Court looked to Pierce "as a charter of the rights of
parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children."27
However, unlike Meyer and Pierce, which dealt with state
statutes that were facially unconstitutional, the Yoder Court
opined that the state law raised "no doubt as to the power of a
State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens,
to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of
basic education."28
Yoder added a protectable parental interest to Meyer and
Pierce under the free exercise clause29 that required the
perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. They must learn to
enjoy physical labor. Once a child has learned basic reading, writing, and
elementary mathematics, these traits, skills, and attitudes admittedly fall
within the category of those best learned through example and 'doing' rather
than in a classroom. And, at this time in life, the Amish child must also grow
in his faith and his relationship to the Amish community if he is to be
prepared to accept the heavy obligations imposed by adult baptism. In short,
high school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish faith-and
may even be hostile to it- interposes a serious barrier to the integration of
the Amish child into the Amish religious community.
Id. at 211-212.
26. Wis. Stat. § 118.15 (1969).
27. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
28. Id. at 229. Both Meyer and Pierce also had recognized that the state could
enact reasonable regulations. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 402 ("The power of the state to
compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations for all schools,
including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not
questioned."); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534 ("No question is raised concerning the power of
the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them,
their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school,
that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught
which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.").
29. The religion clause was not applied to the states through the Fourteenth

172

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2003

government to demonstrate a compelling interest in a literate
and productive citizenry30 before it could overcome the parents'
interest. 31 Where parents' interests in directing their children's
education was "one of deep religious conviction, shared by an
organized group, and intimately related to daily living,"32 Yoder
strengthened parents' rights when balanced against state
interests.
Although Yoder suggests a strengthening of Meyer and
Pierce by combining a parent's right to direct education under
the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment with the free
exercise clause, Yoder may also be a limitation because it
restricted liberty clause protection to threatened religious
beliefs. An even more restrictive interpretation of Yoder might
suggest that liberty clause protection only applied to groups
that "assert . . . an article of faith [and] their religious beliefs
[and whose] 'life style' [has] not altered in fundamentals for
centuries."33
Despite the euphoria of the moment regarding the Yoder
decision, the Court's decision was unclear as to whether the
case would be limited to parents like the Amish. The Court's
declaration that "a regulation neutral on its face may, in its
application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement
for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion" 34 did not define how the limits might apply
as to the reach of state regulations.
In fact, subsequent state and federal courts wrestled with
the application of the Meyer-Pierce-Yoder trilogy to state efforts
to impose state laws and regulations that limited parent
choices for their children. In State of Ohio v. Whisner
(Whisner), 35 the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the truancy
Amendment until Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
30. The State's interests were that "some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system
if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society." Yoder, 406 U.S.
at 221.
31. Id. at 219-234.
32. Id. at 216.
33. I d. at 217. The Amish lifestyle was characterized as a consistent pattern over
300 years of preserving "their mode of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work"
while rejecting modern conveniences such as "telephones, automobiles, radios, and
television." Id. at 217, 219.
34. Id. at 220.
35. Ohio v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750 (Ohio 1976).
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conviction of parents who sent their children to a religious
school that could not meet many of the state's public school
requirements, including facility, credentialing, and curriculum
"minimum standards". In relying on Yoder, the Whisner court
"conclude[d] that the compendium of 'minimum standards'
promulgated by the State Board of Education, taken as a
whole, 'unduly burdens the free exercise of (appellants')
religion."36 In looking to Meyer and Pierce, the court concluded
that
[u]nder the facts of this case, the right of [parents] to
direct the upbringing and education of their children in
a manner in which they deem advisable, indeed
essential, and which we cannot say is harmful, has been
denied by application of
the state's 'minimum
standards' as to them. 37
However, where state efforts to regulate parents'
educational choices were less pervasive, courts were less
disposed to support the rights of parents. For example, in
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 38 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the application of Iowa's teacher
certification requirement to a religious school, even though the
school might not have been able to find religiously acceptable
certified teachers. Citing Pierce for support of the state's claim,
the court noted that the state had "a compelling interest in the
education of its children."39 In addition, the court dismissed the
parents' claim that they were entitled to be treated the same as
the Amish in Yoder, reasoning that they would not suffer as
much harm as the Amish would if the Amish were required to
attend public school beyond the eighth grade. 40 In other words,
while states were prohibited from legislating nonpublic schools
out of existence in Pierce, states might be able to effect a
similar result by applying a limited number of regulations that

36. ld. at 764.
37. ld. at 770.
38. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987).
39. Id. at 490 (citing Pierce, 268 U.S. 510).
40. The court found "more dissimilarities than similarities" between the plaintiffs
in Fellowship Baptist and the Amish. Plaintiffs lived "in ordinary residential
neighborhoods," performed "ordinary occupations such as a nurse, lawyer, engineer,
and accountant [and did not] object to the licensing of these occupations," used modern
conveniences such as "radios, televisions, and motor vehicles," and had no
"distinctive ... dress or lifestyle." ld. at 489.
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the schools would have difficulty complying with. 41
In retrospect, Yoder is the high-water mark for parents'
religious-based educational decisions on behalf of children.
Following Yoder, courts tended to reduce their compelling
interest test to one of reasonableness. 42 When the Supreme
Court, in Employment Division v. Smith (Smith), 43 declared
that "a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law"44 does not
implicate a free exercise claim, the free exercise clause largely
lost its effectiveness as a separate and sole cause of action. 45 A
brief post-Smith resurgence of the Yoder compelling interest
test with Congress's passage of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRAt6 met with failure when the Supreme
41. See also Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church v. Dept. of Educ., 348 N.W.2d 263
(Mich. App. 1984) (application of teacher certification upheld); State ex rel. Douglas v.
Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, 301 N.W.2d 571 (Neb. 1981) (court upheld broad
range of state requirements necessary for state approval); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d
883 (N.D. 1980) (state department regulations specifYing the courses required to be
taught held reasonable).
42. See Kaptein v. Conrad Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d 1311 (Mont. 1997) {court applied
rational purpose test in denying student enrolled in Christian Day School permission
to participate in public school sports); Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, 312 N.W.2d
at 580 (court upheld application of state teacher certification requirement to churchcontrolled school because the requirement was neither "arbitrary nor unreasonable");
Sheridan Rd. Baptist Church, 348 N.W.2d at 274 (court upheld application of teacher
certification to religious school as "reasonable means to give effect to a broader,
compelling state interest- in this case the provision of education to all children.").
43. Empl. Diu., Dept. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(Court refused to recognize the claim of two plaintiffs, denied unemployment
compensation benefits because of the use of a prohibited drug [peyote] during an
American Indian ceremony, for an exemption based on their religious beliefs that
required that they use the hallucinatory drug.).
44. !d. at 880.
45. For a discussion of the devastating effect of Smith, see Ralph D. Mawdsley,
Employment Division v. Smith Revisited: The Constriction of Free Exercise Rights
Under the U.S. Constitution, 76 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (1992). Free exercise is still a viable
claim where government action demonstrates hostility toward religion. See Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Court struck down
four city ordinances, ostensibly directed at preventing the death of animals, but with so
many exceptions that the purpose was to prevent only the Santeria religion's practice
of animal sacrifices.). Smith recognized that free exercise could be a valid claim when
combined with another substantive right, such as parents' right to direct the education
of their children. See Peterson v. Mimidoka County Sch. Dist. No. 331, 118 F.3d 1351
(9th Cir. 1997) (demotion of principal to a teaching position for home-schooling his
children for religious reasons held to be a violation of the principal's free exercise rights
and right to direct education of children).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2000) (RFRA had as one of its purposes "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v.
Yoder . ... " In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963), the Supreme Court
required that the government prove that its regulation was the least restrictive means
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Court struck down RFRA as a violation of the separation of
powers. 47
D. Period Four: Parents' Rights and Legislative Efforts
With the demise of the free exercise clause as an effective
restriction on government regulation of parent educational
choices, only the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
remained as a constitutional limitation on states and local
school districts. However, parents' efforts since Smith to invoke
the Meyer and Pierce liberty clause right to direct their
children's education have been generally ineffective. 48
Does the lack of success using the liberty clause mean that
parents no longer have any legal basis for asserting their
educational claims against school districts? With the exception
of an emerging but generally unsuccessful effort by parents to
assert free speech claims against public schools on behalf of
their children, 49 parents have looked to Congress and state
legislatures to protect their interests.
The two most prominent federal statutes asserting parental
authority have been the Family Rights and Privacy Act of 1974
(FERPA) 50 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975 (hereinafter referred to under its current title, IDEA). 51
For the first time under FERPA, Congress created a national
right of unrestricted access by parents to the education records
of their children, as well as a more limited right to control
of accomplishing its interest). See Porth u. Roman Catholic Diocese of Kalmamazoo,
532 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. App. 1995) (RFRA prohibited state religious discrimination
claim by non-renewed protestant teacher in Catholic school).
47. City of Boerne u. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Court upheld local ordinance,
neutral on its face, establishing historic landmarks, when applied to a church
designated as an historic landmark, even though the effect of the application of the
ordinance prevented the church from altering the fa~;ade of its church as it wanted in
order to make room for a much-needed addition.).
48. Occasionally, a court relies on Meyer or Pierce. See Veschi u. Northwestern
Lehigh Sch. Dist., 772 A.2d 469, 473 (Pa. Cmmw. 2001) (court rejected public school
district claim that it did not have to provide IDEA special education services to a child
in a religious school unless the child enrolled in the public school by observing that the
parents "have a constitutionally protected right to decide where [their son] goes to
school under Pierce u. Society of Sisters.").
49. See e.g. Settle u. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995) (court
upheld teacher's refusal to permit student to write biography on life of Jesus Christ
where teacher mistakenly placed part of her decision on her factual error and on a
misunderstanding of the legal relationship between religion and public schools).
50. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000).
51. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000).
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disclosure of their children's education records. Under FERPA,
parents have "the right to inspect and review the education
records of their children,"52 the right "to challenge the content
of such student's education records,"53 and the right to prevent
disclosure of students' records (with specified exceptions)
"without the written consent of their parents."54
IDEA went even further, declaring parents of special
education students to be equal partners with public schools in
determining the educational program for their children and the
services necessary to achieve that program. 55 Congress declared
as one of its findings in enacting IDEA that the "education of
children with disabilities can be more effective by ...
strengthening the role of parents and ensuring that families of
such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in
the education of their children at school and at home."56
State legislatures have also strengthened parents' rights.
For example, state statutes contributed to parents' selection of
nonpublic school venues for their children by restricting the
number of regulations. Extensive litigation in the 1970s and
1980s regarding the application of state compulsory attendance
regulations to nonpublic schools 57 has given way to statutory
exemptions from many of these regulations. 58 State legislatures
have found ways to minimize state intrusion into curriculum,
personnel, and student matters m nonpublic schools. 59
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g)(l)(A).
53. ld. at § 1232(g)(2).
54. ld. at§ 1232(6)(b)(1).
55. For example, parents have the procedural right "to examine all relevant
records with respect to the identification, evaluation, and educational placement of the
child, and to obtain an independent educational evaluation of the child .... " Id. at §
1415 (b)(1). The IEP is a "written statement of each handicapped child developed in
any meeting by a representative of the local educational agency, ... the teacher, the
parents or guardians of the child." Id. at§ 1401(19).
56. ld. at§ 1400(5)(B).
57. For a discussion of this litigation, see generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Legal
Problems of Religious Schools and Private Schools 163-195 (Educ. L. Assn. 2000).
58. See e.g. the Iowa Code Ann. which exempts:
[R]eligious groups . . .
from school standards when members or
representatives of a local congregation of a recognized church or religious
denomination established for ten years or more within the state of Iowa prior
to July 1, 1967, ... professes principles or tenets that differ substantially
from the objectives, goals, and philosophy of education embodied in standards
set forth in [the [the state code] .... "
Iowa Code Ann. § 299.24
59. Ohio requires that for every child who "attends upon instruction elsewhere
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Although not all of these legislative accommodations come with
a legislative history, the overall effect has been to facilitate
parents' direction of their children's education by making the
operation of nonpublic schools less onerous. All states now
recognize home schooling as a permissible parent option,
although some states exert more regulatory control than
others. 6° For, some states permit students participating in
nonpublic schools (including home schools) to take part in
public school courses and extracurricular activities, including
athletics. 61
However, the accommodations made by states regarding
parents' direction of their children's education apply largely to
the choice of the place where the child will be taught. Most
states do not permit parents to intrude into curricular matters
in public schools. One prominent exception is the
comprehensive Parents Rights and Responsibilities Act passed
in Texas in 2000. 62 This act provides a parent access "to all
written records of a school district concerning the parent's
child."63 In addition, parents can petition the school principal to
add a course, to permit their child "to attend a class for credit
than in a public school such instruction shall be in a school which conforms to the
minimum standards prescribed by the state board of education," [Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 3321.07 (West 2002] which requires only that a nonpublic school be equivalent with
area public schools. See also State v. Hershberger, 144 N.E.2d 693 (Ohio App. 1955) (a
one-room school without artificial light and being taught by a teacher with less than an
eighth grade education was not equivalent). Minnesota requires that "a child receiving
instruction from a nonpublic school, person, or institution that is accredited by an
accrediting agency, recognized according to [Minn. Stat. Ann.] § 123B.445, or
recognized by the commissioner, is exempt from requirements" pertaining to teacher
certification and curriculum. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 120A.22(11)(d) (West 2001).
60. See e.g. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3321.04(A)(2) (West 2002) (A student is
exempted from attending a public or non public schools if "the child is being instructed
at home by a person qualified to teach the branches in which instruction is required,
and such additional branches, as the advancement and needs of the child may, in the
opinion of such superintendent, require."). See generally Christine Field, Field Guide to
Home Schooling (Fleming H. Revell 1998).
61. See Snyder v. Charlotte Pub. Sch. Dist., 365 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. 1984) (student
attending a religious school had right under "an accepted method of education in this
state for over 60 years" to attend a course in the public school."). Contra Swanson ex
rel. Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694 (lOth Cir. 1998) (home-schooled
student did not have right to take foreign language, vocal music and science courses in
public school).
62. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 26.003-26.010 (2002).
63. Id. at § 26.004 (The records are: attendance records, test scores, grades,
disciplinary records, counseling records, psychological records, applications for
admission, health and immunization information, teacher and counselor evaluations,
and reports of behavior patterns.).
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above the child's grade level", and to permit the child to
graduate early if all courses required for graduation have been
completed. 64 The Texas statute states explicitly that such
"request[s] will not be unreasonably denied." Finally, parents
are entitled to review all teaching and test materials to be used
by their children65 and "to remove [their children] temporarily
from a class or other school activity that conflicts with the
parent's religious or moral beliefs."66
What the Texas statute does not provide, though, is a right
for a student to substitute an alternative assignment when the
original assignment is considered offensive on religious or
moral grounds. In other words, a parent's right to remove a
child from an objectionable course does not translate into a
right to replace the assignment. 67
At least one other state, Michigan, has declared that "it is
[a] natural, fundamental right of parents and legal guardians
to determine and direct the care, teaching, and education of
their children."68 However, the extent of parent rights is not
nearly as great as in Texas and parent rights to affect
curriculum are limited only to courses dealing with "sex
education."69
Although federal and state statutes have increased parental
authority in some areas, no broad sweeping constitutional
protection exists such as might have been anticipated after
Meyer and Pierce. Both cases sowed the seeds for their own
limited effectiveness by recognizing that states could apply
reasonable regulations to nonpublic schools. Parental efforts to
direct their children's education today have gone far beyond the

64. Id. at§ 26.003.
65. I d. at§ 26.006.
66. Id. at § 26.010. However, "a parent is not entitled to remove the parent's child
from a class or other school activity to avoid a test or prevent the child from taking a
subject for an entire semester," nor does this provision "exempt a child from satisfYing
grade level or graduation requirements in a manner acceptable to the school district
and the [state education] agency."
67. The law on the subject of replacement is still represented by Mozert u.
Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (parent who objected on
religious grounds to reading series for daughter was not entitled to have school
substitute an alternate, acceptable reading series.).
68. Mich. Stat. Ann§ 380.10 (Lexis L. Publg. 2002).
69. Id. at § 380.1507 (courses dealing with "family planning, human sexuality,
and the emotional, physical, psychological, hygienic, economic, and social aspects of
family life" must be an elective and parents must have the opportunity to review the
contents of the course in advance and to have their children excused from the class.)
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limited protection for nonpublic schools in Meyer and Pierce to
seeking legislative support to effect changes in curriculum,
activities or events within public schools.
However, legislative support has been limited. As a result,
parents have asserted a variety of legal theories to compel
public schools to accommodate the wishes of parents regarding
their children's education. The next section considers the
barriers to parent claims and the most recent legal theory used
by parents based on Title 20 of the United States Code § 1983.
Ill. PARENTS' DIRECTION OF THEIR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION
WITHIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS DURING THE LAST THIRTY YEARS

The efforts by parents to rely on constitutional theories and
state and federal legislatures in effecting changes within public
schools have been patchwork at best. Parents' attempts to
bring direct legal action against public schools under a variety
of§ 1983 claims have also not always been successful, largely
due to various legal developments in public school law that
have not been supportive of parent claims. Among the most
significant of these developments has been the emergence of
student rights. While parents' rights to make educational
decisions for their children frequently overlap with their
children's rights, the two sets of rights are not always so
extensive.

A. The Emergence of Student Rights
Three years prior to Yoder, the Supreme Court, in Tinker u.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 70 declared
that "students . . . [do not] shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.'m
Although Tinker was the wellspring for students' rights, the
case can just as easily be identified as a parents' rights case
since the views expressed by the students in Tinker in wearing
black armbands to protest the war in Vietnam represented the
views of their parents. 72 What Tinker did not address was how
70. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
71. Id. at 506.
72. I d. at 504. The court related these facts:
In December 1965, a group of adults and students in Des Moines held a
meeting at the Eckhardt home. The group determined to publicize their
objections to the hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by
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a court should deal with students' rights where student views
differed from those of their parents.
Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Yoder, opined
that courts have a responsibility to determine whether the
educational decisions made by parents for their children
represent the views of the child. As he observed, while parents
"normally speak for the entire family ... , it is the student's
judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give
full meaning to what we have said about the Bill of Rights and
of the right of students to be the masters of their own
destiny.'m
Justice Douglas's comment was the first recognition by the
Supreme Court that children's interests may not always be
represented by their parents. Three years after Yoder, in Baker
v. Owen,74 the Court affirmed, without opinion, a federal
district court decision involving the use of corporal punishment
that bifurcated the claims of a parent and a student. In Baker,
a parent who objected to a school's use of corporal punishment
did not have a constitutional right to compel a school to
75
discontinue use of that punishment. However, the student
had a liberty clause interest in his own right to protect his
bodily integrity. 76 For the first time, the Court gave tacit
affirmation to the idea that a student's own rights do not have
to be identical with, or a derivative of, those of the parent.
Although the Supreme Court in Baker did not author an
opinion, its affirmation of the district court decision raises a
tantalizing question regarding the balancing of rights between
parents and children. Whose right is at issue in public schools that of the student or that of the parent? Could students'
interests be in conflict with those of their parents, and, if so,
what might be the implications for public schools?
To date, courts (and legislatures) have taken steps to
separate parent and child interests only in isolated situations
such as child abuse reporting by school officials where the
wearing black armbands during the holiday season and by fasting on
December 16 and New Year's Eve. Petitioners and their parents had
previously engaged in similar activities, and they decided to participate in
the program.
73. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 244-245 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74. Baker u. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
75. Baker u. Owen, 395 F.Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975), affd without opinion, 423
u.s. 907 (1975).
76. Id. at 301.
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alleged abuser may be a parent. 77 Should this bifurcation of
parent and student interests be extended to other areas? If
children's rights are independent from those of their parents,
can (or, should) schools equate parents' views with children's
views? If such equation occurs, do the children have a
constitutional right to assert their views? A case in point is the
use of parent consent forms.
Although parent consent forms can serve a number of
purposes for schools,78 the underlying assumption is that
students will not be permitted to participate in a school
function without parent permission. The use of parent consent
forms raises two issues: whether a parent's right to consent
translates into an enforceable claim against a school if consent
is not sought; and whether a student has an enforceable claim
against a school to participate even if the parent does not grant
consent.
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions,
79
Incorporated, a high school principal's requirement that all
students attend an assembly ostensibly dealing with AIDS
awareness, 80 and the principal's refusal to use a parent consent
form required for "instruction in human sexuality" did not
translate into an actionable claim for violating parents' rights
to direct the education of their children. 81 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that, even though the school had

77. See J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919 (lOth Cir. 1997) (court upheld
county social services picking up a home-schooled seven-year-old child from his home
and returning him seventeen and a half hours later in order to investigate alleged child
abuse).
78. See e.g. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (parent
consent form permitting elementary students to attend after-school religious club
eliminated concern about students being coerced to attend the meeting). See also
Summers v. Slivinsky, 749 N.E.2d 854 (Ohio App. 2001) (in a tort liability lawsuit,
waiver and release forms signed by parents were questions of fact to be weighed by
jury in determining whether cheerleader advisor had been reckless in pressuring
injured student to participate).
79. Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
80. Among the activities at the assembly were the following:
[P]rofane, lewd, and lascivious language to describe body parts and excretory
function; advoca[cy] and approv(al] of oral sex, masturbation, homosexual
activity and condom use during promiscuous premarital sex; simulated
masturbation; and hav[ing] a male minor lick an oversized condom with [the
female presenter],after which she had a female student pull it over the male
minor's head and blow it up.
Id. at 529.
81. ld. at 532.
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ignored its own parent consent form requirement, the parents'
claim under Pierce failed because the right to educate one's
children does not encompass "a fundamental constitutional
right to dictate the curriculum at the public school."82
Although this one-time refusal to seek parent permission in
Hot, Sexy, and Safer did not give rise to a § 1983 claim under
the liberty clause, what might have happened if the parent had
denied permission, but the student wanted to attend the
assembly? Does Tinker's right of private, student expression
extend to students' rights to receive information against the
wishes of their parents? In Board of Education, Island Trees
83
Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, a plurality of the
Supreme Court recognized that, at least as to school libraries,
"the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the
recipient's meaningful expression of his own rights of free
speech .... "84 Do school officials run the risk of litigation from
students when they require parent consent forms before
students can view "R" rated films or attend assemblies or other
meetings? To what extent can both students' free expression
rights and parents' rights coexist in the same schools?
To date, the notion that parents' rights can be separated
from those of their children has not received general
acceptance in the United States. 85 Although the temptation to
justify upholding children's rights at the expense of parents'
rights may seem politically expedient to some, separating the

82. Id. at 533.
83. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 u. Pico, 457 U.S. 853
(1982) (The Court struck down a school board's removal of eight books from the school
library because the removal represented the politicaVreligious views of the board
members.).
84. ld. at 867.
85. For a source for student rights apart from parents, see the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, ratified by U.N. General Assembly Nov. 20, 1989, but to which the
U.S. along with Somalia are the only non-signers, which provides in Article 13:
1. The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other media of the child's choice.
2. The exercise of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre
public), or of public health or morals.
Arguably, were the U.S. to become a signatory to the Convention, students might have
the right to information independently from the views of parents.

165]

THE CHANGING FACE OF PARENTS' RIGHTS

183

rights of children from those of parents is a slippery slope that
may well cause the fracturing of the family structure.
B. The Reaffirmation of Public School Control Over
Curriculum
Local school boards' authority to control their schools was
subjected to considerable challenges in the wake of Tinker. 86 In
1986 and 1988, the Supreme Court acted through two
prominent decisions, Bethel School District v. Fraser 87 and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 88 to reassert public
school district control over their schools.
In Bethel, the Court upheld the right of a school to
discipline a student who made a speech with vulgar content
and sexual innuendo to other students. 89 Despite the parents'
support for their child, the Court upheld the right of a school to
"inculcate the habits and manners of civility."90 Bethel
permitted public schools to project a set of values, even if the
values disagreed with those of students and their parents.
What Bethel did not determine, however, is how courts should
apply the case to vulgar student expression that has the tacit
or express support of parents.
While Bethel supports the efforts of school officials to create
a more civil and respectful school environment, 91 not all vulgar
student expression necessarily originates within the school
environment. What options are available to school officials
where words even more vulgar, lewd, and profane than those in
Fraser are used to describe faculty or students on a student's
Web page, created at home but accessible by students on school
computers? Since lawsuits involving student expression are
invariably brought by parents, how can such litigation be
reconciled with parents' direction of their children's education?
86. See generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Constitutional Rights of Students, in The
Courts and Education 161-187 (Clifford P. Hooker, ed., Nat!. Socy. for the Study of
Educ. 1978).
87. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
88. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
89. 478 U.S. 675.
90. ld. at 681.
91. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718 (8th Cir.
1998), where termination of a teacher was upheld for violating a public school board's
policy prohibiting the use of profanity. The teacher who taught English and joumalism
had permitted the in-class performance and videotaping of student plays that included
use of vulgar words violating the policy.
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Do Meyer and Pierce extend to parental support of a child's use
of vulgar and lewd language, especially when the language
originated in the home?
Up to the present, courts have tended to protect off-campus
student expression, even when that expression is hurtful,
harmful, and damaging to others within the school. 92 However,
such protection may contain the seeds of destruction for the
credibility of parental direction of education. If Bethel's support
for public school civility and good manners is to have any
meaning, parents arguably cannot lay claim to both the high
ground of directing their children's education and at the same
time support their children's right to be vulgar, lewd, or
profane. In Bethel, one can argue that the Supreme Court drew
a line in the sand not only as to the expression of offensive
students but also as to the influence of those students' parents.
In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that school officials
have control over school curriculum. 93 In this case, brought by
three students, the Court distinguished between "a student's
personal expression that happens to occur on the school
premises" and "educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public
might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the
school."94
Despite a school board policy that student free expression
would not be restricted for student publications, 95 the Court
opined that school officials were entitled to regulate publication
contents "in any reasonable manner."96 If school officials "do not

92. See Beussink u. Woodland R-N Sch. Dist., 30 F.Supp.2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(court granted preliminary injunction ordering reinstatement of student suspended for
10 days for creating a Webpage critical of school officials where no evidence offered that
Webpage had caused disruption at school when accessed); Emmett u. Kent Sch. Dist.,
92 F.Supp.2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (court injunction prevented enforcement of fourday suspension for creating Webpage with mock obituaries where no one was
threatened on the Webpage). Cf. J.S. u. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412 (Pa.
Cmmw. 2000) (court upheld expulsion of student whose Webpage offered picture of
teacher with head cut off and dripping blood, accompanied by a twenty dollar offer to
pay a hit-man to kill her).
93. 484 U.S. 260.
94. Id. at 271.
95. ld. at 269 ("[T]he Statement of Policy published in the September 14, 1982
issue of Spectrum [school newspaper] declared that 'Spectrum, as a student-press
publication, accepts all rights implied by the First Amendment."').
96. ld. at 270.
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offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,"97 what effect would
Hazelwood have on parent efforts under Pierce to exact
curricular changes for their children?
Hazelwood was understandingly welcomed by public school
officials, but parents who have objected to curricular matters in
public schools have not fared well in the wake of the decision.
In Settle v. Dickson County School Board, 98 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld a teacher's refusal to allow a ninth
grade student to fulfill a research assignment by writing on
"The Life of Christ." Even though the teacher's assertions that
personal religion was not an appropriate subject for discussion
in a public school and that the paper could not satisfy the
assignment by having four sources were inaccurate, 99 the court
held that "teachers have broad discretion in limiting speech
when they are engaged in administering the curriculum."100
Similarly, in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of
Education, 101 the Sixth Circuit upheld the school board's refusal
to accommodate a parent's request for an alternate reading
series based on their religious objections to the one used in
class. 102 In dismissing the parents' complaint because they had
the option under Tennessee law of "either send[ing] them to
church schools ... or teach[ing] them at home,"103 the court
cited for approval to Bethel that "public schools serve the
purpose of teaching fundamental values essential in a
democratic society."104
05
In Immediato v. Rye Neck School District/ when parents
objected to a high school's mandatory community service

97. I d. at 273.
98. Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995).
99. For a refutation of the teacher's claim that the student's only source would be
the Bible, see R. Mawdsley & C. Russo, Religious expression and Teacher Control of the
Classroom: A New Battleground for Free Speech, 107 Educ. L. Rep. 1 (1996).
100. Settle, 53 F.3d at 156.
101. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).
102. The parent who identified herself as a fundamentalist Christian objected to
such themes in the school's Holt Reading Series as "evolution and secular humanism,
futuristic supernaturalism, pacifism, magic, and false views of death." I d. at 1062.
103. Id. at 1067.
104. I d. at 1068 (quoting Fraser, 4 78 U.S. at 683).
105. Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454 (2d Cir. 1996).
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program, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals discounted the
parents' rights under Pierce because the school district had a
"rational basis" in "teaching students the values and habits of
good citizenship, and introducing them to their social
responsibilities." 106
Finally, when a kindergarten student's thanksgiving poster
with a religious theme was taken down from the school hallway
and placed by the teacher in a less prominent place, the Third
107
Circuit Court of Appeals, in C. H. v. Oliva, cited to Hazelwood
as governing
'[S]tudent expression that IS part of a school
curriculum,' including things that students say (or
express by other means, such as artwork) when they are
called upon by their teachers to express their own
thoughts or views. 108
Bethel and Hazelwood have had a substantial impact on
public schools by permitting greater school control over the
school learning environment. In the process of exerting control
over their schools, school officials have found that those actions
will be upheld even when contrary to the desires of parents.
Case law suggests that, whatever the right of parents to direct
their children's education may mean outside the public schools,
parents have few, if any, protectable rights within public
schools. Whether new § 1983 legal theories for damages will
change parents' claims within schools remains to be seen.

C. New Causes of Action Under§ 1983
Although § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 creates no
substantive rights of its own, claimants can sue under § 1983
for damages for violations of the U.S. Constitution and federal
laws. 109 § 1983 has long been a remedy for violations of
constitutional rights, but the difficult issue involving federal
law remedies is whether Congress, in enacting laws, intended
that a remedy for damages be available for violations of those

106. I d. at 462.
107. C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198 (2000).
108. 226 F.3d at 205 (Alito & Mansmann, JJ., dissenting) (citing to C.H., 195 F.3d
at 171).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). § 1983 permits lawsuits for damages for "the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws .... "

165]

THE CHANGING FACE OF PARENTS' RIGHTS

187

laws. 110 Prime examples are FERPA and IDEA Neither statute
expressly authorizes a remedy for damages; and, thus, courts
have had to determine whether providing a remedy for
damages would be inconsistent with Congress' intent.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Falvo v. Owasso
Independent School District No. I-011 111 that parents can sue
for damages under § 1983 for an alleged violation of FERPA
involving confidentiality or student records. In Falvo, parents
had a claim on behalf of their child when a teacher permitted
students to announce students' grades out loud. Most courts
have held that a private damages remedy for a violation of
112
FERPA is available under § 1983. Although the Supreme
Court reversed the Tenth Circuit on statutory grounds, 113 it left
open the question whether FERPA can support a § 1983
114
claim. Even though the Supreme Court ruled in Gonzaga
University v. Doe 115 that a FERPA claim under the
nondisclosure part of the Act is not cognizable under § 1983,
Congress could still amend FERPA to provide such a remedy. 116

110. See Wilder v. Va. Hasp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting Wright v.
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). The court stated
therein:
A plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute will be permitted to sue
under section 1983 unless (1) the statute [does] not create enforceable rights,
privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983, or (2) Congress has
foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.
111. Falvo v. Owasso lndep. Sch. Dist. No. l-Oll, 233 F.3d 1203 (lOth Cir. 2001),
cert. granted, 533 U.S. 927 (2001).
112. For cases supporting a§ 1983 claim under FERPA, see Tarka v. Cunningham,
917 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1990); Fay v. S. Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir.
1986); Ackman v. Chisago Lakes Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 2144, 45 F.Supp.2d 664 (D.
Minn. 1999); Doe v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 918 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. Ky. 1996);
Maynard v. Greater Hoyt Sch. Dist. No. 61-4, 876 F.Supp. 1104 (D.S.D. 1995); Belanger
v. Nashua N.H. Sch. Dist., 856 F.Supp. 40 (D.N.H. 1994); Norwood v. Slammons, 788
F.Supp. 1020 (W.D. Ark. 1991). For cases denying § 1983 claims, see Gundlach v.
Teinstein, 924 F.Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Norris v. Bd. of Educ. of Greenwood
Community Sch. Corp., 797 F.Supp. 1452 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
113. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426 (2002).
114. A § 1983 claim under Falvo is all that much more important because federal
courts have consistently held that FERPA does not permit a private cause of action.
See Frazier v. Fairhaven Sch. Comm., 122 F.Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2000); Hatfield v.
East Grand Rapids Pub. Schools, 960 F.Supp. 1259 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Belanger, 856
F.Supp. 40; Norris, 797 F.Supp. 1452.
115. See Doe v. Gonzaga Univ., 24 P.3d 390 (Wash. 2001), cert. granted, Gonzaga
Univ. v. Doe, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002) rev'd and remanded 122 S.Ct. 2268 (2002).
116. For an example of Congress's ability to eliminate parent claims, see the 1997
amendments to IDEA where Congress removed a private cause of action for child in a
private school to have services provided on-site at a private school if those services
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However, should a § 1983 claim be justiciable using FERPA
either through a Supreme Court decision or congressional
amendment, the implications for public schools are troubling. If
parents can sue for damages when students grade each others'
papers and publicly recite their grades, will schools also be
liable for other actions, such as posting the best student work
on the assumption that the absence of it being posted is a
negative commentary on a student's education record?
The possibility of a § 1983 lawsuit for damages for
violations of IDEA is much more controversial. Three Circuits,
(the Second, Third, and Fifth) 117 have held that an IDEA
damages lawsuit is possible under § 1983, while three other
Circuits (the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth), 118 have ruled that
plaintiffs may not ordinarily bring suit under § 1983 for
statutory violations of IDEA. Damages under § 1983 for an
IDEA violation have a significant impact on school districts
already financially strapped to fund services for special
education students. In addition to the cost of services required
under IDEA, school districts that fail to meet IDEA's "free
appropriate public education" and "least restrictive
environment" requirements 119 can be compelled to pay attorney
fees for prevailing parties in a due process dispute, 120 as well as
the cost of compensatory education. 121 A§ 1983 damages claim
opens school districts to the possibility of yet another cost: that
of a damages award. The difference between the two kinds of
costs is that while those dealing with related services, (and
even attorney fees,) may have an element of reasonable
predictability in many cases, a damages award does not.

would be provided at a public school. See 20 U.S.C. 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) and 34 C.F.R. §
300.454.
117. See Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987); W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d
484 (3d Cir. 1995); Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 918 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.
1990). See also Capillino v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 40 F.Supp.2d 513 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); Padilla ex rel. Padilla v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 35 F.Supp.2d 1260 (D. Colo. 1999);
Zearly v. Ackerman, 116 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.D.C. 2001).
118. See Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 1996); Sellers v. Sch. Bd.
of City of Manassas, Va., 141 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 1998); Heidmann v. Rother, 84 F.3d
1021 (8th Cir. 1996). But see Westendorp v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 273, 131 F.Supp.2d
1121 (D. Minn. 2000).
119. For a sample of cases, see Allan Osborne, Students with Disabilities, in The
Yearbook of Education Law 2000 174-77 (C. Russo, ed., Educ. Law Assn 2000).
120. See e.g. Angela L. v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist. 918 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1990).
121. See e.g. Big Beaver Falls Area Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 19 IDELR 371 (Pa.
Cmmw. 1992); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1990).
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A split in the circuits on the issue of damages under a
federal statute is always discomforting. How school districts
are affected depends solely on geography. For districts that are
subject to § 1983 claims, school budgets already strained to
122
meet the costs of special education services under IDEA must
accommodate another possible expense. Litigation involving
FERPA is nowhere near as extensive as that involving IDEA,
although a judicial or legislative decision upholding a § 1983
claim will very probably have the effect of increasing the
number of lawsuits. Without a § 1983 damages claim, the only
remedy under FERPA is the withholding of federal funds, a
123
highly unlikely event.
One can reasonably expect that the prospect of a damages
award under FERPA and IDEA will provide parents with
powerful leverage in addressing issues of education record
confidentiality, special education services, and negotiating
favorable settlements. Under FERPA, will school districts risk
continuing practices that disclose identifiable information
regarding a student's education record if a parent objects? Will
even the most benign displays of student work be a
discontinued practice because of a perception of the poor
education record of those not displayed? Likewise, will school
officials no longer have any incentive under IDEA to resist the
requests for services by parents with special education
students when an open-ended damages award is possible?
Congress has the authority to act regarding judicially
permitted damages awards under its laws. At least three
legislative actions are possible. Congress could simply amend
FERPA and IDEA to prohibit the recovery of damages;
Congress could permit damages but limit the amount of
recovery; or, Congress could permit recovery but set a high
standard for a statutory violation, such as conduct by school
officials. Given Congress's reluctance generally to address tort

122. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(a)(l)(A). It states that:
No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any
educational agency or institution which has a policy of denying, or which
effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in
attendance at a school of such agency or at such institution, as the case may
be, the right to inspect and review the education records of their children.
123. For a discussion oflegal issues related to hearings under FERPA, see Thomas
Johnson, Inaccurate and Misleading: Student Hearings Under FERPA, 114 Educ .. L.
Rep. 721 (1997).
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liability limits/ 24 one can question whether Congress will
address damages limitations for FERPA or IDEA

IV. CONCLUSION
Since the rights of parents were first framed under common
law in the nineteenth century, those rights have changed in
large part because everything around them has also changed.
When students were granted constitutional rights by the
Supreme Court, the inevitable question, as indicated by Justice
Douglas's dissenting comments in Yoder, was whose rights the parents or the students - were school officials going to deal
with. The answer to that question still seems to be the rights of
the parents, but only because the legal history in the United
States has supported the identifying of student interests with
those of their parents.
However, if parents have preserved their rights vis-a-vis
their children, those rights have not significantly impacted
parents in their ability to effect changes within schools. As
suggested by the reaffirmation of school authority under Bethel
and Hazelwood, the rights of parents have diminished while
those of school officials have been strengthened. New legal
remedies suggest that, at least for certain areas within public
schools, parent lawsuits for damages under § 1983 may
significantly increase parent leverage on school officials.
However, these § 1983 lawsuits will still not reach the
curriculum areas where parents have been unsuccessful in
effecting changes in the past.
Even though parents have not been successful in facing
changes within public schools through litigation, parents have
achieved many of their goals to select the educational venue for
their children. Many of the purposes that parents sought to
achieve using the Meyer-Pierce-Yoder trilogy have been
achieved, not in the courtroom, but in the assemblies of state
legislatures and Congress. Parents have greater freedom today
in choosing nonpublic venues for their children with state
relaxation of regulatory control over those schools. At least one
124. Congress has yet to pass legislation limiting recovery in products liability
litigation, despite congressional reports recommending such a limit. See Sen. Rpt. 103203 (1993) (chronicles the abuse or compensation and client recovery in products
liability litigation); H.R. Rpt. 104-63, at Part I, sec. 7 (1995) (proposed legislation
limiting punitive damages recovery in products liability litigation to $250,000).
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state, Texas, has given parents considerable legislative
authority within schools. The extent to which other states will
follow remains to be seen.
Comparing the rights of parents today to those under
common law in the nineteenth century is not easy. How one
views the current status of rights of parents to direct the
education of their children depends on where the children are
being educated. For those who choose to educate their children
outside public schools, the authority of parents is probably
greater today if only because state statutory changes have
limited the regulation of nonpublic schools. With fewer
regulations of nonpublic schools, parents have more
opportunities to select nonpublic school options for their
children. For those children who stay within the public schools,
the parents' rights to direct education are not as protected as
under common law. This lack of protection is largely due to the
greater authority that the Supreme Court has given to school
officials in controlling curriculum.

